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Abstract: Traditional economic analysis posits market-based institutions as being substitutes for non-market based institutions. 
The process of development then tends to be seen as the process of substituting the more efficient market based institutions for 
their less efficient counterparts. This paper argues that non-market institutions are at times more efficient than market based 
institutions. Informal pooling arrangements constituted an important method of non-market consumption smoothing for medieval 
peasants. Usury prohibitions were promulgated in order to support such arrangements in the face of competition from more 
market-based alternatives, i.e., the capital market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have long been sensitive to the role played by 
institutions—especially market based institutions. Adam 
Smith engaged in institutional analysis when he compared the 
relative efficiency of joint stock companies to sole 
proprietorships, arguing the former tended to overly dilute 
incentives toward effort and care. Especially important for 
economists is the role of institutions in facilitating growth 
over the very long-run (North, 1981, North, 1990, North and 
Weingast, 1989).
1 Many economic historians have made 
institutions and their evolution central to their analysis. North 
and Thomas (1973) argued that is was the formation of 
economically efficient institutions that allowed Britain (and 
eventually Northwestern Europe) to grow so much wealthier 
than their neighbors. Institutions are economically efficient for 
North and Thomas if they serve to equate private costs and 
benefits with public costs and benefits— efficient institutions 
being generally equated with market institutions.  
 
Economists are also interested in the effects of culture on 
economic performance, although theoretical analysis of 
culture’s impact on long-run growth is a relatively recent 
development. Culture’s potential effects on all manner of 
economic variables—consumption patterns (Jones, 1988), 
savings, invention (Mokyr, 1990), commerce, science (Jacob, 
1997), etc.—is fundamental to the growth success (or lack 
thereof) of many regions around the world. Recent work by 
Landes (1998) stressed the role of the west’s unique culture 
in explaining Europe’s developmental success. 
 
But while market institutions and culture have had much 
                                                             
1 From Greif (1994, p. 913), “The organization of a society—
its economic, legal, political, social, and moral enforcement 
institutions, together with its social constructs and information 
transmission and coordination mechanisms—profoundly 
affects its economic performance and growth.” 
study, their interdependence has not. Economic logic mostly 
suggests that market-based institutions and cultural-based 
institutions are substitute arrangements. In this view, the very 
notion of development is often equated with the substitution 
of the market for traditional (non-market) based institutions. 
Recent work argues that this view may be misleading. Greif’s 
(1994, p. 914) analysis suggests that culture plays an 
important role in determining the nature of institutions, both 
traditional and modern. Further, he argues that market 
institutions may be substitutes for, complements to, or even 
embedded in, traditional institutions, “The theoretical and 
historical analyses indicate the importance of a specific 
cultural element—cultural beliefs—in being an integral part 
of institutions and in affecting the evolution and persistence of 
diverse societal organizations.”
2  
 
In his work on late medieval Mediterranean trade, Greif posits 
extended networks of friends and acquaintances—part of 
what he terms a “collectivist society”—as a substitute for 
formal contract enforcement mechanisms relied on by 
“individualist societies.” Maghribi traders were Muslim 
merchants who competed with Genoese traders based in Italy. 
They belonged to a collectivist society and did not sue their 
agents when contracts were breached, as Genoese traders did, 
but simply choose to exclude the offending party from further 
trades. This was possible since personal histories were known 
in Maghribi society. The Genoese pursued a more formal 
legalistic model, with personal histories not being common 
knowledge, agents of the Genoese were sued when they 
breached a contract.  
 
Greif’s (1994, p. 944) general conclusion is that the 
institutional forms the two cultures adopted were significantly 
different enough to effect their growth performance, and that 
this relationship between culture, institutions, and growth is 
pervasive, 
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“Past, present, and future economic growth is not a 
mere function of endowment, technology, and 
preferences. It is a complex process in which the 
organization of society plays a significant role. The 
organization of society itself, however, reflects 
historical, cultural, social, political, and economic 
processes.” 
 
Greif finds that the legalistic Genoese approach proved more 
efficient than the personal networks of the Maghribi (they 
were able to dominate the trade of the region). But of course 
this need not always be the case. In some instances, traditional 
institutional arrangements may prove a more efficient way of 
organizing economic activity then markets. 
 
In this paper we argue that the most efficient way for 
medieval peasants to purchase insurance was to pool their 
incomes
 3  and that such arrangements were facilitated by 
Roman Catholic usury prohibitions. Operating in a capital 
market requires the possession of physical assets while 
participating in income sharing arrangements required social 
capital. Peasants were relatively well endowed with the latter 
but not the former. The majority of the peasant population 
simply did not have the resources to smooth consumption via 
credit. Given that capital markets posed a threat to pooling 
arrangements, the Catholic Church sought to make pooling 
more attractive by forbidding borrowing and lending at 
interest. In other words, they sharpened usury prohibitions. 
Usury prohibitions fluctuate throughout the period we are 
interested in. While Christian theology has long contained at 
least some commentary on borrowing and lending at interest, 
usury prohibitions were not official Church policy until 1000 
AD. Usury prohibitions were strengthened running up to the 
Black Death, loosened afterwards and eventually abandoned 
altogether. We exploit this variance in usury prohibitions to 
test the theory that they were primarily promulgated to protect 
pooling arrangements. 
 
 
1.1  Risk and Harvests 
 
Medieval peasants lived in a dire environment. Peasants faced 
a large dispersion in their seed yields, exposing them to a 
great deal of consumption risk. Medieval crops were 
susceptible to a lack of rainfall, too much rainfall, a flooding 
creek, frost, bugs, molds and all other manner of shocks. 
Further, seed yields in an average year—after replenishing 
one’s seed stock and paying one’s tithes—left many on the 
margin of physical subsistence.
4  
                                                             
3 What we call a pooling arrangement here is usually termed 
an income sharing arrangement. 
4 For those who worked outside the agricultural sector the 
evidence on unskilled wages suggests that they faced the same 
 
Highly variant subsistence cereal production meant that the 
threat of starvation and/or malnutrition was very real to 
medieval peasants. Data on seed yields collected by 
McCloskey (1976) suggests that a peasant farming 20 acres 
of scattered land faced a subsistence crisis once every 13 or 
so years; peasants on consolidated land faced it once every 7 
years.
5 This is consistent with attempts to estimate periods of 
particularly poor harvests using price data (Hoskins, 1968a, 
1968b).  
 
Evidence of repeated subsistence crises amongst the medieval 
peasantry does not exist. In fact, as far as we can tell, a 
peasant farming 20 acres
6 of land faced almost no possibility 
of starvation. This suggests that the medieval peasantry had 
access to powerful methods of consumption smoothing. 
Medieval Europe, without such consumption smoothing 
mechanisms, may not have survived a single generation—
certainly equilibrium population levels would have been 
much reduced. Capital markets were of course relatively 
underdeveloped in the medieval period and insurance markets 
all but nonexistent.
7 Whatever insurance mechanisms 
peasants exploited, they must have developed alongside the 
market rather than within the market. 
 
 
1.2  The Efficacy of Pooling 
 
Medieval peasants had the following methods of consumption 
smoothing available to them:
8 
 
1.  Borrowing from manorial lords (e.g. in bad years 
rents could be lowered or forgiven entirely);  
2.  borrowing internally by consuming grain that 
normally would have been planted for next year’s crop;  
3.  selling or leasing land in bad years;  
4.  storing grain;  
5. scattering  holdings;   
6.  engaging in illegal activities—stealing, urban food riots, 
peasant insurrections; 
7.  borrowing (against collateral) at positive interest rates 
through the private capital market  
8.  pooling incomes through the Church, through fraternal 
                                                                                                      
issues. Wages for the highly skilled were highly variant and 
often fell below subsistence. 
5 Open field farming was the practice of scattering one’s strips 
throughout a village in small plots of roughly an acre. Fields 
that were consolidated saw all of a peasants holdings being 
held together in one large plot. For a description of scattering 
see (McCloskey, 1976).  
6 Note, farming 20 acres of land actually made a peasant 
relatively wealthy. 
7 This is especially true when one considers rural areas, the 
location of most agricultural activities, as opposed to cities. 
8 See Reed and Bekar (2001) for a more complete discussion. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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organizations, and through informal mechanisms 
supported by Church doctrine;  
9.  receiving charity directly and indirectly through the 
Church. 
 
Methods 1 – 5 rely on the ownership of land; option 6 has no 
entry costs but is socially disruptive. Method 7 requires that a 
peasant have access to significant collateral or future 
earnings. Method 8 requires that the peasant belong to some 
form of insurance pool (either formal or informal, see Bekar 
and Reed). Anyone could receive charity and thus exploit 
method 9.  
 
We have elsewhere employed simulation analysis to evaluate 
a selection of consumption smoothing mechanisms: storage, 
scattering, and pooling (see Bekar and Reed, 2001). These 
consumption-smoothing alternatives were ranked in terms of 
their costs and their ability to reduce a peasant’s “Probability 
of Disaster.”
9 We found that the most effective method of 
insuring against consumption risk was the pooling of 
incomes. Storage was reasonably effective, while scattering 
was expensive and relatively ineffective. Thus, income 
sharing is one possible explanation for how peasants facing 
such low and variant yields escaped persistent starvation. 
 
Assume a set of n individuals whose income is subject to both 
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Each agent receives a 
“good” harvest realization, g, with probability p and a “bad” 
harvest realization, b, with probability (1-p). The average 
harvest is simply pg + (1-p)b. Given risk averse agents, the 
utility of each agent would be increased by pooling the 
income of all agents and evenly splitting the resulting 
“pool.”
10  Such pooling arrangements are capable of providing 
members of the pool with full insurance.
11 Economies for 
which data are available suggest that perfect insurance is 
rarely if ever achieved. 
 
In practice, constraints on individual incentives or costs to 
supporting such a pool constrain us away from such 
outcomes. As noted above, the pooling of incomes is a very 
powerful mechanism for smoothing consumption. So 
powerful, in fact, that full income sharing is often not required 
to drastically reduce the variance in consumption. For 
example, even if pooling costs a great deal, and peasants 
pooled only a fraction of their income, (say 20%) a peasant 
would face only a 2% probability of disaster in a given year. 
This means that an average peasant would face disaster but 
once every 50 years. Compare this to once every 13 years for 
                                                             
9 Where POD is defined as the chance that an average peasant 
in an average year faces a subsistence crisis. 
10 Such sharing arrangements have been extensively studied. 
For a discussion of their formation and viability see Kimball 
(1988). 
11 Full insurance is defined by each member of the pool getting 
to consume the average level of consumption. 
a peasant that scattered their land.  
 
Pooling arrangements supportable solely by the threat of 
expulsion from the pool were therefore an extremely effective 
way to reduce the probability a peasant would face disaster in 
a given year. 
 
Income sharing arrangements amongst peasants faced at least 
three challenges to their stability. First, as noted above, 
peasants required land in order to generate a harvest to share. 
Peasants with small landholdings would find pooling 
relatively difficult. Second, pools of heterogeneous agents can 
be harder to support since they require subsidies from the 
wealthy to the poor. So, as income inequality increased, 
pooling arrangements became threatened. Third, the capital 
market existed as a substitute to pooling arrangements. Thus, 
the more efficient the capital market became, the less viable 
were pooling arrangements. 
 
Elsewhere we argue (Reed and Bekar, 2001) that the Church 
supported the viability of informal pooling arrangements and 
charitable donations to assist the rural poor. We further argue 
that they supported these efforts through usury prohibitions. 
The reason the Church was willing to spend the resources to 
promulgate and enforce costly usury prohibitions is that they 
were a major landowner and in the business of saving souls. 
A stable and growing population enhanced both of these 
positions and usury was the least cost way to protect such a 
population’s viability. 
 
 
1.3 Usury  prohibitions 
 
Pooling is a potentially efficient way to smooth consumption 
but they may not always be stable, breaking down of their 
own accord or in the face of competition from alternative 
forms of insurance. 
 
Importantly, pooling arrangements are susceptible to the 
formation of sub-groups (made up of single or multiple 
agents) which may smooth consumption with one another. 
Genicot and Ray (2000) call this process “endogenous group 
formation.”
12 The possibility of splinter group formation is 
problematic since it reduces the efficacy of the surviving pool 
by reducing the number of agents over which risk is shared. If 
the “wrong” agent types leave the group this may also 
threaten the pools stability. If the departing group forms based 
on a set of desirable shared characteristics (high income, low 
risk, possession of collateral), then the surviving pool may be 
harder to support. This is true for at least two reasons. First, 
due to diminishing utility of consumption, low-income agents 
are more likely to defect from a pool in a bad year. Second, a 
                                                             
12 As any individual may be tempted to defect from a pooling 
arrangement if the payoff is high enough, so might a group of 
individuals. This possibility effects the stability of the pool. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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pooling arrangement amongst relatively low-income agents 
will provide reduced protection against consumption risk. 
Thus agents in a low income pool have a relatively high 
incentive to defect— convex preferences imply that each unit 
of consumption not shared is cherished that much more for 
poor agents—and a low incentive to cooperate—pooling buys 
less insurance amongst low income agents.  
 
Pooling arrangements were also subject to competition from 
alternative sources of consumption smoothing. The capital 
market is a substitute form of consumption smoothing, but not 
a perfect substitute. Assets valued in the credit market—
collateral, a credit history, income level—are not as valued in 
a pooling arrangement. What determines whether or not a 
peasant smoothed consumption in the capital market or 
through a pool? The relative costs of the two alternatives: the 
cost of pooling is the time, effort, and resource costs of 
maintaining a network of friends and relatives; the cost of the 
capital market is the transaction costs of writing and enforcing 
debt instruments. Thus, when transaction costs in the capital 
market are low relative to pooling costs the pool would be 
susceptible to breakdown. When the costs of pooling become 
relatively high the pool is similarly vulnerable.  
 
The Church, however, had influence over the relative costs of 
pooling and the capital market. The usury doctrine preached 
that borrowing and lending at interest was a terrible sin. 
Church members that practiced usury spent eternity in hell. 
There were few exceptions, but importantly the restrictions 
were not applied to investment loans.
13 Thus, by increasing 
usury prohibitions, the Church could effect the relative price 
of pooling and the capital market. Why would the Church 
choose to do so? The Church owned a vast amount of land, an 
asset whose value is enhanced by a stable and growing 
population. Further, the Church was in the business of saving 
souls, something made easier if parishioners were kept alive. 
Lastly, it has been postulated that a tripartite division of labor 
existed in Europe in which the Church was charged with 
providing social services for the peasantry. 
 
We thus have three variables determining the required level 
of usury prohibitions and a motivation for the Church to 
enforce them. All else equal, the Church should increase 
usury prohibitions when land ownership was relatively low, 
equality was low, or the capital market relatively efficient. 
Elsewhere (Reed and Bekar, 2001) we argue that the 
historical chronology of usury prohibitions is in fact well 
explained by this theoretical structure.
 14 A summary of those 
findings is presented in Table 1.  
 
 
                                                             
13 Which suggests that the Church was concerned foremost 
with the market for small scale consumption loans and not 
with the general principle of charging interest. 
14 For a more complete discussion see, Reed and Bekar, 2001. 
Table 1: Chronology of Usury Prohibitions and Determining Variables. 
Period Land 
Ownership 
Equality Capital 
Market 
Usury 
Prohibitions 
  500- 
1050 
High degree 
of land 
ownership 
Relatively 
Equal 
None 
exists 
Poorly defined, 
applied primarily 
to clerics 
1050- 
1175  
High degree 
of land 
ownership 
Increase in 
Inequality 
None 
exists 
Usury prohibitions 
tighten, any 
positive interest 
rate declared 
usurious 
1175- 
1350 
Many 
marginal 
peasants 
Very low  Much 
more 
efficient 
Usury prohibitions 
peak, the sin of 
usury meant 
excommunication 
1350- 
1500 
Land 
ownership 
increases 
(post 
plague) 
Increasing 
equality 
More 
efficient 
Usury prohibitions 
return to those of 
period 1050-1175 
1500- 
1600 
Many 
marginal 
peasants 
Very low  More 
efficient 
Usury prohibitions 
increase again, the 
sin of usury means 
excommunication 
1600 - 
1830 
Many 
marginal 
peasants 
Relatively 
low 
Efficient 
modern 
capital 
markets 
Usury prohibitions 
are relaxed and 
finally ended in 
1830 
 
Thus, when peasant pooling arrangements are threatened 
either from an increased incentive to defect (more efficient 
capital market), or decreased source of insurance (falling land 
ownership or increased inequality), the Church had an 
incentive to intervene and support the pool. When the pool 
became relatively more stable, the Church did not have such 
an incentive. 
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
The efficiency of pooling arrangements made them a powerful 
source of non-market consumption smoothing for medieval 
peasants. Such traditional approaches to solving the problem 
of risk management relied heavily on the ability of peasants to 
punish those who failed to cooperate, but not through formal 
mechanisms such as courts. Medieval peasants had to rely 
much more on mechanisms that Greif would term collectivist. 
Peasant communities, knowing a individuals history, were 
able to exclude those who failed to cooperate from informal 
pooling arrangements. The capital market, an individualist 
solution to risk management, threatened these collectivist 
approaches.  
 
In this case, market and non-market institutions were clearly 
substitutes. Ironically, the development of capital markets 
may not have always been a clear benefit to the peasantry. In 
fact, that the Church desired to slow the development of a 
capital market dealing in small-scale consumption loans 
suggests that an efficient capital market may have negatively 
impacted peasants in at least one dimension. It made their 
insurance more expensive.  
 IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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